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The New Yorker Magazine published an article less than a month
before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,1 stating:
[a]s is demonstrated by the history of scandal from Helen of Troy
to Monica of Beverly Hills, sex has a way of befogging the higher
intellectual faculties; and, as is demonstrated by the prosperity of
the legal profession, the law in general is not always a model of un' J.D., 1997, Nova Southeastern University and is an associate at Shutts & Bowen LLP, in
Miami, Florida, concentrating on labor and employment litigation.
1. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
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2

The author managed to summarize not only the history of sexual
harassment law, but also its future in one simple sentence.
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., on March 4,
1998. s However, in an attempt to clarify the law, the Court imposed
subjective "common sense" and "reasonable person" standards.4
These standards added to the unsettled nature of sexual harassment
law in situations when someone harasses a person of the same gender
and the perpetrator does not harass in search of sexual gratification.'
Before the Supreme Court decided Oncale, district and circuit
courts of appeal divided themselves on the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment. 6 At first glance, the differing opinions seem to depend
on the personal views of the judges themselves. However, further
analysis reveals that the cases are divided along a sexual orientation
line, a line that the Oncale decision does not resolve.
Title VII protection is not dependent on sexual orientation.8 Nevertheless, courts in the past manipulated the concept of sexual discrimination, creating a form of judicial discrimination that protects

heterosexuals, regardless of whether the heterosexual person is the
harasser or the harassed. 9 As a general rule, if the harasser is homosexual, courts find a valid cause of action for same-sex sexual harass-

2. Jeffrey Toobin, The Trouble with Sex: Why the Law of Sexual HarassmentHas Never Worked,
THE NEwYORKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 48.
3. See Onale 118 S. Ct. at 998 (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII).
4. See id. at 1003 (stating that same-sex sexual harassment should be judged from "the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position....").
5. See id at 1002 (noting that sexual harassment is not always about sexual activity).
6. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that samesex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII); Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs.,
112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 1188 (1998).
7. See Oncae 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (noting that same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII need not be based on "implicit proposals of sexual activity," and, therefore, the sexual
orientation of either party may or may not be relevant or dispositive).
8. See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating
that "Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals").
9. See Henson v.City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that Title VII
does not provide a remedy for an employee when the sexual conduct of a supervisor is directed
towards both sexes because in such a case the sexual harassment is not based on sex because
both sexes are treated equally); see also McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d
1191 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming the lower court holding that an "employee did not have a claim
for hostile work environment in violation of Title VII based on heterosexual-male-onheterosexual-male harassment"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996); infra notes 119-36, 292-318
(analyzing and comparing cases involving same-sex sexual harassment claims).
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ment regardless of the plaintiff's sexual orientation." Alternatively, if
the harasser is heterosexual, the court is unlikely to find a valid cause
of action for same-sex sexual harassment, regardless of the plaintiff s
sexual orientation." Even more disturbing is that if the harasser is
heterosexual, and the plaintiff is homosexual, (or if the harasser perceives the plaintiff as not "a good enough man, ,2 and therefore assumes the victim to be homosexual), the court is even less likely to
find a cause of action.' 3 The result is discrimination against homosexual persons through judicial protection of heterosexual machismo
behavior. 4 Essentially, the courts are more likely to impose liability in
same-sex sexual harassment claims when the harasser is homosexual. 15
The increased possibility of sexual harassment litigation involving
homosexuals may act as a deterrent to businesses otherwise willing to
hire homosexuals. 6 This judicial discrimination discourages employers from recognizing and addressing homosexual
employee com7
plaints about sexually harassing conduct.
The Oncale opinion states that there is a cause of action for samesex sexual harassment. 8 However, the vague "common sense" language, combined with a "reasonable person" standard, allows for con10. See discussion infra Part III (discussing and comparing cases that demonstrate the history ofsame-sex sexual harassment in the Eleventh Circuit).
11. See infra text and accompanying notes 119-36 (detailing the facts and analysis of a case
in the Northern District ofAlabama in which the court dismissed same-sex sexual harassment as
"horseplay").
12. See Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (discussing the factual scenario leading to the employee's claim of same-sex sexual harassment).
13. See id. at 1456 (finding no cause of action when the harassment started with the plaintiff being questioned as to why he had no wife or girlfriend. The court held that the harassment was not the kind that created an anti-male environment; and such conduct was not the
type Congress intended covered by Title VII.).
14. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing judicial discrimination); see also infra notes 274-318 and accompanying text (reviewing and analyzing the facts and holdings of
several cases involving same-sex sexual harassment where both parties are heterosexual, or
where one party is heterosexual and the other is homosexual).
15. SeeJoyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (holding samesex sexual harassment actionable under Title VII where harasser was homosexual); see also infra
notes 51-65 and accompanying text (discussing the early Middle District of Alabama decision
holding that the plaintiff established same-sex sexual harassment where the harasser was homosexual and the harassed was heterosexual); infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text (discussing an Eleventh Circuit holding finding same-sex harassment where the supervisor was homosexual and the court determined that the discrimination occurred because the employee was
heterosexual).
16. Joyner,597 F. Supp. at 537.
17. See id. at 538-40 (concerning a same-sex sexual harassment claim where supervisors did
not act appropriately after an employee informed them of the sexually harassing conduct of his
immediate supervisors).
18. See Oncae, 118 S. C. at 1002-03 (stating that when the conduct of a supervisor is severely hostile or abusive from the perspective of a reasonable person, then the harassment is
actionable under Title VII).
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tinual judicial discrimination, because lower courts can classify machismo behavior as "simple teasing or roughhousing."'9 This article
discusses the future of same-sex sexual harassment claims by examining the history of same-sex sexual harassment law. First, this article
explains the standard for a sexual harassment claim under Title VII.
Second, this article discusses the Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale
v. Sundowner Services, Inc. Third, this article examines the history of
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII, using the Eleventh Circuit as a model. Last, this article challenges lower courts to step away
from their previous discriminatory treatment of homosexuals to create a body of law that consistently finds liability based on harassment
"because of sex."
I.

THE BASIS FOR SAME-SEx SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act of 1964,0 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991," lists actions that constitute unlawful employment practices. 2
The statute specifically states:
[i]
t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2
21

Sexual harassment is a type of sex discrimination. There are two
kinds of sexual harassment claims, quid pro quo, and hostile work
environment.5

The first type of sexual harassment claim is quid pro quo sexual
harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment is the traditional form
of sexual harassment: "you sleep with me and I will promote you/not
fire you. '2 6 To establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual
19. Id. at 1003.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1997).
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1997).
24. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that the courts
rely upon the EEOC's issued Guidelines, which specify that sexual harassment is a type of sex
discrimination, and that the Supreme Court may resort to them for guidance).
25. See George Noel Lawrence, What Everyone Should Know About Sexual Harassment,But Was

Afraid to Ask, 60 TEX.BJ. 1024, 1027-31 (1997) (defining the two kinds of sexual harassment).
26. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing the characteristics of quid pro quo sexual harassment situation in which "the supervisor relies upon his
apparent or actual authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee"); see also 29
C.FR.§ 1604.11 (1997) (defining conduct that constitutes violations of Tide VII, including requests for sexual favors when submission is made a term or condition of employment);
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harassment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they belong to a protected
group; (2) they were subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3)
the harassment was based on sex; and (4) the harassment altered the
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
The second type of sexual harassment is the hostile work environment.2s The elements required to establish a prima facie case for a
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim include the following: (1) the person belongs to a protected class; (2) he or she was
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was
based on sex; (4) the harassment was "sufficiently pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment;" and (5) "the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment.. ." and failed to act, (respondeat superior) .2
Courts often rely upon persuasive authority in determining
whether a cause of action exists under Title VII for same-sex sexual
harassment."0 One argument is that no claim for same-sex sexual
harassment exists without the legislative intent to create one.3 ' When
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a southern Congressman who wanted to quash the bill moved to add sex to the Act's protections at the last minute 2 Therefore, discussion regarding the legislature's intent in adding sex as a protected class is minimal.33 As a
result, courts often use the legislature's silence surrounding inclusion
of sex as a protected class under Title VII as an indication that the
legislature never intended to cover same-sex sexual harassment under
Title VII.34 It is unlikely that the legislature ever considered same-sex
CATHERINE McKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-37 (discussing and distinguishing the two types of sexual harassment).
27. SeeVirgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994) (describing
the elements required to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment and
applying these elements to find the employer liable for sexual harassment).
28. See Mentor,477 U.S. at 65 (declaring that hostile work environment sexual harassment
is a form of sex discrimination and actionable under Title VII); see also MCKINNON, supranote
26, at 40-47 (discussing and defining hostile work environment sexual harassment).
29. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05 (describing the requisite element of a prima facie hostile
work environment claim).
30. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63 (using the legislative history of Title VII to interpret its meaning and application); see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 908 n.18.
31. See Theos D. McKinney, III., Recent Developments in the Law Regarding Same-Sex Sexual
Harassmen4 SB56 ALI-ABA 29, 32 (1997) (describing some courts' reliance on legislative intent
to justify not recognizing same-sex sexual harassment).
32. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
33. Id.
34. See Fredette v. BVP Management. Assocs., No. 94-325-CIV-ORL-18, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13954, at *11-12 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 1995) (discussing the intentions of the legislature),
granted in part and denied in par4 905 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Ala. 1995), rev'd, 112 F.3d 1503 (11th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998).
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sexual harassment as a cause of action in their 1960s deliberations.
Nevertheless, a majority of trial court judges dismiss the "never intended" argument, reasoning that because Title VII applies to both
genders equally, 5 a cause of action exists as long as the harassment is
based on sex.3
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECIDES THE ISSUE
CONCERNING SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Justice Scalia delivered a short but powerful decision on March 4,
1998, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. 7 The Court created
three important aspects in sexual harassment law: (1) the Court established a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment; (2) the
Court imposed a reasonable person standard to evaluate whether
same-sex sexual harassment exists in each particular case; and (3) the
Court explained that "[c]ommon sense and an appropriate sensitivity
to social context.. ." is the standard used to distinguish sexual har-

assment from simple "teasing and roughhousing. 09
Joseph Oncale filed a sexual harassment claim after his supervisor
and two-co-workers restrained him while placing one of their penises
on Oncale's neck, threatened homosexual rape, and forcefully
pushed a bar of soap into Oncale's anus. 40 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals did not rule in favor of Oncale because the court did not
make a factual determination regarding first, the threats of homosexual rape, and second, the homosexuality of the defendant.4'
On appeal, the Supreme Court used precedent in establishing a
cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment.42 The Court stated
that, "[there is] no justification in the statutory language or our

35. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676-82 (1983)
(discussing how the Court applied an equal protection analysis to Title VII claims and how this
reasoning can apply to both male and female employees).
36. See infranotes 164-81 and accompanying text (analyzing a court decision that reviewed
and rejected the legislative intent argument by citing to precedent that focused only on the
language ofTitle VII. That court concluded that the only important issue was whether the sexual harassment was "because of" the employee's sex, regardless of the sex of the two parties.).
37. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
38. Id. at 1003 (commenting on the importance of considering the social context of the
behavior that is in question).
39. Id.

40. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing the harassment suffered by the plaintiff), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
41. Id.

42. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1001-02 (1998) (reviewing prior court decisions involving Title VII claims of sex discrimination, including cases dealing with sexual harassment as well as hiring practices).
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precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment
claims from coverage of Title VII. " The Court addressed the precedent of no male-on-male sexual harassment and dismissed the legislative history argument by explaining that "statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.""4
Most significantly, the Court stated "that the objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiffs position considering all the circumstances.""
By imposing a reasonable person standard, the Court allowed the social conscience of society to dictate the standard. 46 In addition, the
Court attempted to guide the reasonable person standard by explaining that common
sense is used to distinguish between "teasing and
4
roughhousing."
The Court illustrates "roughhousing" with a creative and simple
example:
[a] professional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him
on the buttocks as he heads onto the field - even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed."
The problem with placing "teasing" and "roughhousing" outside
the scope of same-sex sexual harassment is that in the past, courts
failed to find a cause of action in same-sex sexual harassment cases by
using this exact language. 49 By establishing this broad and subjective
standard, the Court acknowledged and consented to, what is, in reality,judicial discrimination. 5'
43. Id. at 1002.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 1003.
46. See id (stating that describing a physical act or repeating the offensive words is not
enough to capture the true impact of the incident).
47. Oncale; 118 S. C.at 1002-03.

48. Id. at 1003.
49. See supranotes 8-14 and accompanying text (commenting on the apparentjudicial protection of heterosexual employees and co-workers who sexually harass employees); see also infra
notes 119-36 and accompanying text (relating the facts and holding of a case involving same-sex
sexual harassment described by the court as "horseplay").
50. Oncake, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
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III. THE HISTORY OF SAME-SEX HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN THE ELEVENTH
CIRcurr

A. Middle Districtof Alabama
The Middle District of Alabama decided the first reported same-sex
sexual harassment case in the Eleventh Circuit in 1983.*1 The plaintiff, Joyner, was a shop mechanic and later a driver for a transportation company. 2 At a local drive-in restaurant, the terminal manager
approached Joyner, who subsequently entered the terminal manager's car.53 The terminal manager touched Joyner's "private parts"
and asked him to engage in homosexual acts. 54 Joyner refused and
then told the chairman of the board about the incident.5 5 The
chairman seemed shocked and assured Joyner he would investigate
the incident further.56 The chairman then called the general manager of the company, who later assured Joyner that he resolved the
problem. 57 However, days later the terminal manager toldJoyner that
he knew ofJoyner's complaint and implied that if he had the authority he would fire Joyner.58 The defendant transferred Joyner to a new
position, but with the transfer came a loss of seniority, and the defendant ultimately laid Joyner off. Joyner continually inquired
about the possibility of reemployment but was given a series of excuses by both the terminal manager and the general manager chairman.6 Ultimately, Joyner was the only full-time driver not recalled
after the layoff, and the company hired a new employee for his job.6'
The lower court did not frame the issue as one involving same-sex
sexual harassment. 62 Instead, the court identified the issue as
whether unwelcome homosexual harassment constitutes a claim un-

51. SeeJoyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (declaring that
homosexual harassment violates Title VII because sexual harassment is discrimination based on
sex, and Title VII violations apply in a heterosexual as well as a homosexual context), affd, 749
F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984).
52. Id. at 539.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Jryne, 597 F. Supp. at 539.
57. Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 539-40.
Id. at 540.
Jyner, 597 F. Supp. at 541-42.
Id. at 541.
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der Tide VII using the quid pro quo framework.63 The court determined that there is such a cause of action, and applied the standards
for proving a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment to
the facts of Joyner's case. 4 While the court did not use the actual
buzzwords "same-sex harassment," it did establish a cause of action
for sexual harassment between two people of the same gender.6
The same-sex sexual harassment debate heated up in the Middle
District of Alabama in early 1995.6 Once again, the plaintiff alleged
quid pro quo same-sex sexual harassment.67 Prescott, the plaintiff,
was the Staff Sales Manager for Independent Life Insurance Company-" Meeks was the District Manager, and Prescott's direct supervisor.69 Meeks allegedly subjected Prescott to harassment by unwanted
touching, threatening Prescott's employment status, and promising
professional advancement if he responded to Meeks' advances."
Prescott claimed that when he refused Meeks' advances, Meeks created a false record of insubordination, and ultimately terminated
him.7'
The defendant, Independent Life Insurance, asserted that homosexual same-sex sexual harassment was not actionable under Tide
VII.7 The court rejected the defendant's argument, and found quid
pro quo same-sex sexual harassment actionable under Title VII.73
The court based its holding on Congress' choice to use the unmodified term "sex" when referring to sexual harassment, rather than
"member of the opposite sex."74 According to the court, Congress intended to prohibit discriminatory treatment by a supervisor or company because of an employee's sex; a cause of action for same-sex
sexual harassment arises when, but for the employee's gender, the

63. Id at 541-42.
64. 1&
65. See generally id. at 541-42 (developing a prima fade standard for cases of homosexual
harassment under Title VII).
66. Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
(discussing the differences between quid pro quo and hostile environment same-sex sexual harassment).
67. Id. at 1548.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70.

l

71. Prescott 878 F. Supp. at 1548.
72. See id. at 1549 (referring to Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D.
Md. 1994)).
73. Id. at 1550.
74. Id

592
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harassment would not have occurred. 5 The court held that Prescott
established a claim for homosexual same-sex sexual harassment because Meeks asked for sexual favors in exchange for continued employment, and Prescott's treatment was based on gender. 6
The Middle District of Alabama again addressed whether a cause of
action exists for same-sex sexual harassment in McElroy v. TNS Mills,
Inc. 7 The plaintiff, McElroy, was a forklift operator in a warehouse. 8
He had a series of reprimands, was often late or absent from work,
and many employees considered him to have a drinking problem."
Brooks was McElroy's supervisor and often told McElroy that he
looked or smelled good, but never made any physical contact with
him. 0 McElroy complained, but his supervisors did not take his
complaints seriously.8 McElroy's co-workers teased him about having
to work with Brooks alone.82 A witness testified that Brooks told her
that he was homosexual and frequented a gay bar.3
One day, McElroy arrived at the beginning of a shift smelling of alcohol and Brooks confronted him.84 Brooks told him to clock out
and come back the next day. McElroy denied drinking any alcohol
prior to arriving at work.86 The following day, McElroy had a meeting
with the plant superintendent who attempted to convince McElroy
not to quit, but McElroy quit anyway. McElroy never indicated that
he was quitting because of Brooks' behavior, or because Brooks sexually harassed him.s However, soon after he quit, McElroy filed a
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging
sexual harassment by Brooks.89
The court rejected the defendant's argument that a cause of action
did not exist for same-sex hostile work environment sexual harass75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1550-51.
Prescot4 878 F. Supp. at 1551.
McElroy v. TNS Mills, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1385.

80. Id.
81. Id.

82. McElroy, 953 F. Supp. at 1385.
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Id
86. Id.

87. McElroy, 953 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
88. Id. at 1586.
89. Id.
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ment 9 Instead, the court followed Prescott,91 and found the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment irrelevant."
In dicta, the court declined to follow the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Mayo v. Kiwest Corp.,93 which held that there is no hostile environment
same-sex sexual harassment when both parties are heterosexuals of
the same sex.94 The court in McElroy states that the "gravamen of the
cause of action is the creation of a hostile work environment based
on gender. Hence, whether or not either party is [a] homosexual
[person] seems to the Court to be immaterial."9' 5
Most recently, the Middle District of Alabama addressed same-sex
sexual harassment in Sneed v. Montgomery HousingAuthority." Beverly
Sneed was an assistant housing complex manager with the Montgomery Housing Authority. 97 She was excessively absent during the years
1990 and 1991, which her employer noted on her yearly evaluations.98
During July of 1992, Carol Brown, Sneed's supervisor, allegedly discussed lesbian activities with a tenant." Soon after, Brown allegedly
put her arm around Sneed and stroked Sneed's hair."' Brown complied when Sneed told her to stop. 0 1
After Sneed received a warning letter for excessive absences, she
complained about Brown's advances.'02 The Housing Authority conducted a short investigation by meeting with both Sneed and
Brown.'03 Sneed requested a transfer, and two months later the Housing Authority transferred her. 04 Sneed's new supervisor was unhappy
with her work, and called her in for a meeting.' 9 Sneed alleged that

90. Id at 1387.
91. Prescott 878 F. Supp. at 1549 (discussing the differences between quid pro quo and hostile environment same-sex sexual harassment).
92. McElroy, 953 F. Supp. at 1387.
93. 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996).
94. See McElroy, 953 F. Supp. at 1388 n.3 (citing Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir.
1996)).
95. Id at 1388.
96. 956 F. Supp. 982 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
97. Id- at 983.

98. IdL
99. Id.
100. Id
101. Sneed v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., 956 F. Supp. 982, 983 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
102. Id. at 984.
103. l&
at 985.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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she was verbally attacked for her poor work quality.0 6 She further alleged that the stress of the confrontation aggravated her diabetes,
and she requested another transfer. 7 Again, the Housing Authority
granted her the transfer, and Sneed's attorney indicated that she
However,
would begin her new position on January 19, 1993.10
Sneed was too ill to return to work.' 9 Her attorney failed to inform
the company that she was ill."0 Sneed eventually resigned on February 3, 1993, without ever returning to work."' In her resignation,
Sneed claimed that the Housing Authority did not provide her with
safe working conditions, and she therefore refused to sign a release
form for her claims in exchange for another transfer.112 Sneed
claimed that she was a victim of sexual harassment."5
In determining whether Sneed was a victim of sexual harassment,
the court followed Prescott and concluded that Title VII allowed an action for same-sex sexual harassment."4 The court examined the case
as a hostile environment claim because there were no facts to support
a case for quid pro quo sexual harassment."' The court found that
the timing of plaintiff's sexual harassment charge undermined her
credibility because Brown and Sneed worked together for years without incident."6 The court also concluded that Sneed's claim lacked
credibility because it was only made after a high-level supervisor
threatened to terminate her due to poorjob performance."' Accordingly, the court held that Sneed failed to carry the burden of proof
necessary to prevail on her sexual harassment claim."'
B. Northern Districtof Alabama
The Northern District of Alabama addressed the issue of same-sex
sexual harassment only once in Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway

106. Sneed, 956 F. Supp. at 985.
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Sneed, 956 F. Supp. at 986.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. Id.
115. Id
116. Snee, 956 F. Supp. at 987.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Co."' Edwin Martin was a Mechanical Supervisor at Norfolk Southern's Birmingham railway yard. 20 Hornbuckle was Martin's immediThomasson worked under Martin, and Summerlin
ate supervisor.'
was also a mechanical supervisor.'2 Hornbuckle, Thomasson, and
Summerlin sexually harassed Martin during the period they worked
More specifically, Martin alleged that Hornbuckle
together.'2
grabbed his genitals and made inappropriate remarks, including calling Martin "pretty," and telling Martin he wanted "to bend him over a
chair and have sex with him. ' 24 Summerlin, along with Hornbuckle,
offered to expose his penis to Martin and asked to see Martin's penis."2 Summerlin pulled his pants down, exposed his buttocks to
Martin, and grabbed Martin on several occasions.12 6 Thomasson also
grabbed Martin, put him in a headlock, tried to kiss him, pinched
him, told him he was cute, and stated that Martin's girlfriend was
ugly. 27 None of the three propositioned Martin to have sex, and
there was no evidence that any of the men were homosexual.
Martin spoke with Hornbuckle and other supervisors in the company about the harassment.9' He neither contacted the company's
Equal Employment Opportunity Department, nor notified the Master
Mechanic.2 Martin eventually took medical leave, and when he did
not return to work at the end of the leave, the company terminated
him.
The court discussed hostile environment and sexual harassment at
length, stating that a fundamental reason hostile work environment
sexual harassment is actionable as sex discrimination is because of
The court
the harasser's perceived need for sexual gratification.
then reasoned that because same-sex heterosexual hostile environment sexual harassment has no presumption of, or need for, sexual

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. AIa. 1996).
Id. at 1046.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1046-47.
Martin,926 F. Supp. at 1046-47.
Idat 1046.
Id. at 1047.
I&
Id
Martin,926 F. Supp. at 1047.
I&
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
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gratification, there was no sex discrimination. i3" The court cited Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc.,'3 which proposed that same-sex
heterosexual sexual harassment can be as innocuous "as mere locker
room antics, joking, or horseplay."'' 5 The court finally concluded
that there was no cause of action for same-sex heterosexual sexual
harassment, and dismissed Martin's claim. 5
C. SouthernDistrictof Georgia
The Southern District of Georgia addressed same-sex sexual harassment in McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. 37 McCoy, a security guard, alleged sexual and racial harassment by two other female security guards, Ivey and Black.Is Ivey rubbed her breasts
against McCoy's chest, rubbed McCoy between her legs, and forced
her tongue into McCoy's mouth.3 9 Black, who was often assigned to
the same car as McCoy, referred to McCoy as "stupid poor white
trash" and
"white bitch," and told McCoy they were going to make
40
her quit.
On a motion to dismiss, the court upheld a cause of action for
same-sex sexual harassment. First, the court listed the elements of a
prima facie case of sexual harassment under Henson.' The court
stated that the third element, requiring that the harassment be
"based upon sex," was established by showing that "'but for the fact of
her sex, [plaintiff] would not have been the object of harassment."""3
The court further held that to prove the harassment was based on
sex, McCoy must show that her harassers "'did not treat male employees in a similar fashion.'"" Using the Henson analysis, McCoy established sexual harassment "by showing her harassers only harassed
women and, thus, did not treat men in a similar fashion.' ' 45
133. I
134. 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996).
135. See Martin, 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (citing Tietgen v. Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
136. Id. at 1050.
137. McCoy v.Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
138. Id. at 231.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 232.
142. McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232 (referencing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903
(11th Cir. 1982)).
143. Id. at 232 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 903).
144. Id.
145. Id
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Middle District of Georgia

The Middle District of Georgia addressed same-sex sexual harassment in McCoy v. Macon Water Authority.14 , In this case, the court denied a hostile work environment claim in a summary judgment motion.47 McCoy was the supervisor and sole employee at two water
plants for the Macon Water Authority.14 ' His supervisor was Charles
Birkencamper, the manager at a different plant.149 McCoy testified
that Birkencamper asked him about the size of his penis, asked him
about the size of his girlfriend's vagina to figure out how big his penis
was, and commented on his body.'50 Birkencamper also speculated
about McCoy's sexual performance, invited McCoy to car shows out
of town in order to share a hotel room, and told McCoy about intimate relations he had with a male friend. 51 Another employee testibody.5 2
fied that Birkencamper also told her about his male friend's
Birkencamper even refused to allow McCoy to attend a seminar so
that McCoy would go with Birkencamper to a different seminar held
atJekyll Island, giving Birkencamper an opportunity to see McCoy in
a bikini bathing suit.15
McCoy complained to Thompson, the Director of Plant Operations, who told McCoy to avoid Birkencamper. 54 Thompson held a
staff meeting and warned the staff not to discuss "things of a personal
nature."'5 Following the staff meeting, Birkencamper did not make
any more comments. 5 When a local television station inquired
about the situation, the Executive Director of the Macon Water
After questioning McCoy
Authority, Holcomb, became involved.
and two other employees, Holcomb wrote McCoy stating that there
was no justification for a charge of sexual harassment.' 58 On the same
day, McCoy received a new schedule which he found "excessively de-

146. 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
147. Id. at 1213.
148. Id at 1214.

149. Id
150. Id.
151. McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1214.
152. Id.

153. a
154. UL
155. 1&
156. McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1214.

157. AL
158. Id.
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manding."'5 9 McCoy filed an equal employment opportunity charge,
and when Holcomb learned about the charge, he called McCoy into
his office for a meeting, which McCoy described as threatening.'60
Following the meeting, McCoy filed an additional charge with the
EEOC alleging retaliation' Soon after, McCoy's company instructed
him to report to another supervisor, Bledsoe. They also moved his
records to Bledsoe's office and ordered other employees to spy on
McCoy. 62 McCoy resigned because of the continued retaliation.'60
The court reviewed the Goluszek v. Smith 'T legislative intent argument, which denied same-sex sexual harassment claims,'60 but then
stated that the Eleventh Circuit's Henson 66 decision bound the
court167 Citing Henson, the court reasoned that "[a] sexual harassment plaintiff need not show that every member of his or her sex was
subject to the harassment, but only that 'but for the fact of [his or]
her sex, [he or] she would not have been the object of harassment" 6 The court also used the reasoning found in Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut, Inc.,'9 which focused on the plain language of Title VII,
with specific emphasis on the words "because of... sex.' 70 The court
concluded that the only relevant inquiry under Title VII "is whether
the harassment
was directed at the plaintiff as a result of the plain7
tiff's sex." '
The court further reasoned that the "but for" approach "requires
an inquiry into the 'sexual preference' of the harasser."'
Quoting
Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. from the Northern District of
Alabama,'" the court determined that "[t] he presumption arises from
the sexually oriented harassing conduct and [that it] is predicated
upon the perceived need for sexual gratification.""'7 Because of the
159. Id
160. Id.
161. McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1214.
162. Id at 1214-15.
163. I& at 1215.
164. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. IMI.1988).
165. See McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1215 (citing Golue 697 F. Supp. at 1456).
166. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
167. McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1216.
168.

See id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).

169. See id.
(citing Wrightson v. Pizza Hut, 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996)).
170. Id. For a discussion of Wrightson, see infra text and accompanying notes 297-302.
171. Id.
172. McCoyv, 966 F. Supp. at 1217.
173. For a discussion of Martin, see supratext and accompanying notes 119-36.
174. McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1217.
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demand by the harasser for sexual gratification, the victim was singled out because of his or her gender. 5 The court concluded that
Title VII provides a cause of action for homosexual same-sex sexual
a cause of action for heterosexual
harassment, but does not provide
76
same-sex sexual harassment.

The McCoy court found that a claim for homosexual same-sex sexual harassment existed because McCoy presented enough evidence to
show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was sexually
harassed.' 77 McCoy presented evidence sufficient for a court to find
the harassment was "based on his sex" 78 by showing Birkencamper
was not interested in women, and a woman in the office would not
have been subjected to similar treatment.1 79
The court also determined McCoy presented enough evidence to
prove that the sexual harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege of employment."'80 McCoy presented evidence that he was repeatedly asked intimate anatomical questions and questions about his
sex life, and that he experienced8 mental and physical symptoms as a
result of the work environment'

1

E. Middle District ofFlorida
The Middle District of Florida first addressed same-sex sexual harassment in Fredette v. BVP Management Assoc. 8 2 Robert Fredette was a
backwaiter at Arthur's 27, a restaurant on the twenty-seventh floor of
Florida183
the Lake Buena Vista Palace Hotel in Lake Buena Vista,
Mr. Dana Sunshine was Fredette's manager who had influence over
hiring, firing, scheduling, and teaming of waiters. 84
Sunshine made continual sexual advances toward Fredette"e
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. See supratext and accompanying notes 28-29 (defining the third element of a hostile
work environment claim); see also McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1218 (describing the third element as a
.critical" one, causing courts to generally support a conclusion that there is no same-sex sexual
harassment).
179. McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1218.
180. See id (citing the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim); see also supra
text accompanying note 18.
181. McCoy, 966 F. Supp. at 1218.
182. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., No. 94-325-CIV. ORL-18, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13954 (M.D. Fla. 1995); see Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 905 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Fla.
1995), rev'd, 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997).
183. Fredett, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *2.
184. I&
185. Id.at *2-5.
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When Fredette first started working at Arthur's 27, Sunshine told
Fredette he knew a "good way" Fredette could become captain.'
Fredette responded to Sunshine that he preferred to be promoted as
a result of hard work, and Sunshine responded, "hard is exactly what
it takes.",87 Fredette objected to Sunshine's advances, who told Fredette to go ahead and complain to personnel, because previous complaints had not hurt Sunshine's employment record.1 s Sunshine also
ogled and propositioned other male waiters, promoted a waiter to
captain in exchange for sexual favors, and told Fredette when confronted, "Dy] ou can do what you want, but I control your income."'89
When Fredette complained to an assistant manager, the manager
told him "the gay issue is a dead issue."' 9 Sunshine also made sexual
comments and suggestions to Fredette outside the workplace.''
On New Year's Eve, 1992, Sunshine grabbed Fredette, stared at his
groin, and then made an obscene comment about Fredette's appearance.12 Due to the stress of the unwanted sexual attention, on January 3, 1993, Fredette became intoxicated at an adjacent bar and
caused a disturbance." The disturbance led to Fredette's suspension
from work.'94 The restaurant also required Fredette to seek alcohol
counseling and submit to random drug tests.195
Soon after, Fredette reported Sunshine's inappropriate behavior to
David Mitchell, the hotel's human resources manager, and told him
that he had seen a counselor.9 6 Fredette further detailed his complaints against Sunshine to Mitchell. 97 The same day, another waiter
verified many of Fredette's complaints.9 The director of human resources met with Sunshine and gave him a written reprimand. 9 Over

186.

M at *3.

187. Id.
188. Fredette 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *3.
189. Id. at *4.
190. Id
191. See i- (noting that Sunshine's sexual partner admitted to other employees that they
could get better table assignments and, thus, make more money if they engaged in sexual conduct with Sunshine).
192. Fredette, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *4,
193. Id at *5.
194. Id.
195. Ii
196. Id.
197. Fredette 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *5.
198. Id
199. Id.
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the next year, two others filed complaints against Sunshine."'
Fredette's relationship with Sunshine deteriorated rapidly.20 1 Sunshine no longer propositioned Fredette, but began to enforce previously unenforced workplace rules.02 Sunshine told Fredette not to
speak to other waiters, assigned Fredette to fewer and lower tipping
tables, and had an alleged friend file a complaint stating Fredette
threatened him.0 3 On the advice of his doctor, Fredette
resigned and
24
subsequently filed charges for sexual harassment.
In court, the defendants, BVP Management Associates, 5 contended that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title
VII. 2°1 Magistrate Baker rejected the defendant's argument, but first

explained the reasoning of courts that have found no cause of action
for same-sex sexual harassment by analyzing Garcia v. Elf Atochem
North Americc0 7 and Goluszek v. H.P. Smith 0 According to Baker, the
Garciaand Goluszek courts held that Title VII does not cover same-sex
sexual harassment because Title VII addresses gender discrimination,
and Congress intended the statute to promote "equal employment
opportunity through freedom from discriminatory workplace intimidation. ,20 9 The Goluszek court further concluded that Title VII was
enacted to cure abuse of power imbalance "by the powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group. 2, 0 A
sexual harassment claim is actionable under Title VII only if the offender expresses through words or deeds that the victim is inferior
because of his or her sex. 21 ' Therefore, this type of discrimination
could not 2exist for a male who works in a male-dominated work envi21
ronment
Magistrate Baker rejected the Garcia and Goluszek argument and
200. Id.
201. Id. at *6.

202. Fredette, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *6.
203. I-

204. 1&
205. See ia- at *2 (noting that defendant BVP Management Associates operated Arthur's 27,
the restaurant where Mr. Sunshine and Mr. Fredette worked).
206. Id. at*7.

207. Garciav. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
208. See Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (discussing same-sex sexual harassment in terms of gender discrimination); see also Fredette 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954,
at *12-13 (discussing the reasoning of the courts in both Garciaand Goluszek).
209. SeeFredette 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13954, at *13 (citing Golusze, 697 F. Supp. at 1456).
210. See id. (quoting Golusze-,697 F. Supp. at 1456).
211. See id (citing Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456).
212. Id
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explained that it is the employee discriminated against, rather than
23
the discriminating supervisor, who is the proper focus of inquiry. 1
Further, the Magistrate concluded, regardless of the supervisor's sexual orientation, Tide VII would not fulfill its goal if supervisors could
harass employees with exemption. 4 Continuing, Baker pointed out
under Garciaand Goluszek, based on the employee's gender and the
supervisor's attention thereto, the employee was denied the opportunity to work in an environment free of discrimination. 21 5' Thus, Magistrate Baker held21 6Title VII provides a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment.
The defendant filed an objection to the Magistrate's report.27 After reviewing the Magistrate's report and recommendation, BVP's objection to the Magistrate's report and Fredette's response to BVP's
objection, the court granted BVP's summary judgment motion on the
Title VII claim.218 Judge Sharp pointed to Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuit case law, which provides that "'sex' as used in Title VII is not
synonymous with 'sexual preference. ," He further writes that harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not
necessarily state a claim, even if there are sexual overtones, because
Title VII addresses gender discriminationY
Judge Sharp reasoned that the discrimination occurred only after
Fredette refused the manager's advances, and stemmed from both
the refusals and the fact that Fredette had a different sexual orientation than Sunshine.2' The court concluded Title VII does not provide a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment because of
one's sexual orientation or preference, and therefore, Fredette did
not state a claim under Tide VII.
The plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
which overturned the lower court's decision, holding that a cause of

213. Id. at*16.
214. Fredette, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXUS 13954, at *16.
215. Id.at*17.
216. Id.
217. Fredette,905 F. Supp. at 1035.
218. See id.(finding no cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation or
preference).
219. See id.at 1037 (citing Uane 742 F.2d at 1082, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); DeSantis v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327,329-30 (9th Cir. 1979)).
220. See Fredette, 905 F. Supp. at 1037 (quoting Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,
451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)).
221. Id.
222. Id

Summer 1998]

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

action for same-sex sexual harassment exists under Title VII.23 The
Eleventh Circuit presented the issue as whether "the sexual harassment of a male employee by a homosexual male supervisor is actionable under Title VII."2 2 4 The court of appeals used the statutory language of Tide VIIu and determined that same-sex discrimination

occurs "because of such an individual's... sex. 226 Interestingly, the
court analogized same-sex harassment to reverse discrimination, stating a claim is viable because "the widespread acknowledgment of the
viability of reverse-discrimination claims (which often involve the7
same-sex context) stands as an implicit rejection of BVP's position.",2
The court then cited persuasive Fifth and Sixth Circuit authority.228
The Fifth Circuit denied a same-sex sexual harassment claim.229 The
Sixth Circuit held that, "when a male sexually propositions another
male because of sexual attraction, there can be little question that the
behavior is a form of harassment that occurs because the propositioned male is a male - that is, 'because of sex."'2 0 The Fredette court
also analyzed the reasoning of Goluszek, which the Eleventh Circuit
district court reviewed.2 1 Ultimately, the court held that "when a
homosexual male supervisor solicits sexual favors from a male subordinate and conditions work benefits or detriment on receiving such
favors, the male subordinate can state a viable Tide VII claim for gender discrimination. 2
The Middle District of Florida also addressed same-sex sexual harassment in Marciano v. Kash n' Kary Foodstores, Inc.2
Marciano, a
night shift clerk, was supervised by Canlin.2 Cantlin told Marciano
he had a "cute butt" and often wolf whistled at him. 5 Cantlin ex223. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997).

224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 1504-05.
226. See id (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)).
227. Id. at 1506.
228. See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1506 (citing Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d
443 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding repeated sexual advances by homosexual male on male actionable
under Title VII); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996)

(finding no merit in same-sex sexual harassment claims), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
229. See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508 (citing Oncake, 83 F.3d at 120 (stating that "all same-sex
sexual harassment claims" are barred)).
230. See id. at 1506 (quotingYeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th
Cir. 1997)).
231. McCoy, 965 F. Supp. at 1216.
232. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510 (emphasis added).
233. No-94-1657-Cv-T-17A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10491 (M.D. Fla.July 1, 1996).
234. Id, at*2.
235. I4
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posed himself to Marciano and told him to "suck it... you know you
want it. "= Marciano complained numerous times and asked for a
transfer, which the management repeatedly denied.23 7 Soon after
Cantlin exposed himself to Marciano, the management terminated
Candin, and only a few days later, Kash n' Karry asked Marciano to
resign. m
The defendant maintained same-sex sexual harassment was not actionable under Title VII based on Fredette. 9 The court distinguished
this case from Fredette (tried in the district court) on factual grounds;
Fredetteis a quid pro quo case while Marcianois a hostile environment
case.240 The court reasoned that Congress intended Title VII to create a workplace free of gender harassment. 24 Sexual orientation is an
incidental occurrence, which is irrelevant in hostile environment
cases. 24 The court further distinguished Fredetteby noting that plaintiff Fredette's cause of action failed because he refused to accept sexual advances.2 In this case, as in all hostile environment cases, there
was no allegation that the supervisor's acts resulted from plaintiff's
refusal to accept the supervisor's sexual advances.244 Thus, the court
denied the summary judgment motion.2
F.

Southern DistrictofFlorida

The Southern District of Florida first addressed the issue of samesex sexual harassment in LIampallas v. Mini-CircuitsLab, Inc.246 Llampallas and Blanch were admitted lesbians who met in New Jersey in
1977.247 Soon after they came to Florida, Blanch became the General
Manager at Mini-Circuits. 248 Llampallas was an assembler. 24 9 Llampallas' employer eventually promoted her to a position second in rank to

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Marciano,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10491, at *2.
Id. at*7
Id.at*9.

241. Id. at *8.

242. Id.
243. Marciano,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10491, at *2.
244. Id.
245. Id. at *10.

246.
P43,699
247.
248.
249.

No. 93-2053-CIV-ATKINS, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21199, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
(S.D. Fla. May 19, 1995).
Id. at*3.
Id.
Id.
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Blanch."' Throughout their relationship, Blanch told Llampallas if
their relationship ended, she would terminate Llampallas. 5 ' Llampallas ended the sexual relationship in 1990.212 Blanch insisted they
resume
sexual relations and again threatened to terminate Llampal5. 3
las.
Nine months later, Blanch called the president of the company,
Kaylie, and told him that she was resigning because she could no
longer work with Llampallas. 4 Kaylie told Blanch not to quit and requested that Llampallas fly to New York to meet with him.5 5 When
Llampallas got to New York, Kaylie placed her on suspension with
pay.0 ' Kaylie told Llampallas he was thinking about opening a new
facility, and she would be the production supervisor. 7 Kaylie eventually told Llampallas he was not going to open another plant, and
terminated Llampallas.5
The Llampallas court held, without explanation, that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Tite VII. 9 The court also concluded that Blanch subjected Llampallas to quid pro quo sexual harassment. 26° Kaylie was strictly liable for Blanch's actions.
and Mini262
Circuits' termination of Llampallas violated Tide VII.
The Southern District of Florida also addressed same-sex sexual
harassment in Sullivan v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.26 Kevin
Scott, Barry Sullivan's superior at Amtrak, became intoxicated on a
business trip, placed his hand below Sullivan's waist, and told Sullivan
2
to "come to my room for a short while .... You won't regret it.6
Sullivan refused, and from that point, Scott's performance evalua-

250. Id.at *4.

251. Llampallas 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21199, at *4.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *4.
254. Id. at *6.
255. Id at *6-7.

256. Llampaas,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21199, at *7.
257. Id
258. Id. at *7.

259. See id. at *15 (cidngJoyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala.
1983), affd per curiam, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984)).
260. Id. at *20.

261. Llarapallas,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21199, at *20.
262. Id.
263. No. 95-0037-CIV-GRAHAM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20699, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 263 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996).
264. Id. at*14.
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tions of Sullivan dropped.s6 Scott told Sullivan that there was no
place for him in the organization. Scott then referred Sullivan to the
Inspector General for missing gift certificates and cellular phone
misuse.2 66
The court held that "same-sex sexual harassment involving ostensibly homosexual advances is actionable under Title VIL" 267 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited numerous circuit court cases providing a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment under Title
VII. 26 The court then cited from the liberal language of the EEOC
2 0
269
Compliance Manual, and interpreted the language of Title VII. 1
According to the Sullivan court, the statute's phrasing, "'because of
one's sex"' prohibits discrimination against an individual "because of'
that individual's "sex., 271 In the case of same-sex homosexual sexual
harassment, the victim is being discriminated against because he or
she is of the same sex as the harasser. 27 2 Therefore, Title VII provides
a cause of action for same-sex harassment involving homosexual ad273
vances.
IV. ELEVENTH CIRCUrr REASONING
Even before the Supreme Court decided Oncae,274 a cause of action
for same-sex sexual harassment already existed in the Eleventh Circuit.27 5 Unfortunately, the holding was very narrow and only covered

homosexual same-sex sexual harassment. 276 Many district courts followed the logic of Prescott and fouad that Congress intended to prohibit discriminatory treatment based on sex, and held that a cause of

265. Id. at *14-15.

266. Id
267. Id. at *7.

268. No. 95-0037-CIV-GRAHAM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20699, at *3, 73 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 263 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996). The court cited: Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist.,
80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.
1995); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 733, 130 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1995); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d
Cir. 1993).
269. Sexual Harassment § 615.2(b)(3), 2 EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) 615:0004
(1987).
270. Sullivan v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 95-0037-Civ-GRAHAM, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20699, at *6, 72 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 263 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996).
271. Id.
272. Id. at *7.
273. Id.
274. Oncae, 118 S. Ct at 998.
275. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1503.
276. Id at 1510 (darifying "the narrowness of our holding today").
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action exists when, but for the employee's gender, the harassment
would not have occurred. 77
In supporting a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment,
Prescott closely follows Henson v. City of Dundee 8 without actually citing it. Henson describes the critical third element of a sexual harassment claim, "based on sex," which is established by showing "but for
the fact of [his or] her sex, [he or] she would not have been the object of harassment. '' 279 The Eleventh Circuit District Courts, which
explain their reasoning and do not use Prescott to find a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment, rely on Henson.2" Following the
authority established by the district courts, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals 2used
Henson to find a cause of action for same-sex sexual
1
Y
harassment.
The only case holding that a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment does not exist is also the only case in the eleventh circuit
to address heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment: Martin v. Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. 2 2 The court avoided the Henson and Prescott decisions, and instead, reasoned that sexual harassment is based on a
need for sexual gratification. 283 When there is no presumption of
sexual gratification (as with same-sex heterosexual sexual harassment), sex discrimination ceases to exist and the acts can be attributed to mere joking.284 Fredetteestablished that a cause of action exists
for homosexual same-sex sexual harassment. 23 However, Martin is
still persuasive authority in light of the Supreme Court's "common
sense" and "teasing and roughhousing" language. 6

277. See supra note 66, at 1550. Other cases using the Prescott reasoning are McElroy v. TNS
Mills, Ina, supratext and accompanying notes 77-90, and Sneed v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., supra
text accompanying notes 96-118.
278. 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding no sexual harassment between opposite
sex co-workers).
279. Id. at 903. The other elements provide that, "the employee belongs to a protected
group," "the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment," "the harassment com]
plained of affected a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment," and "[r espondent [was a]

superior." I280. Cases using the Henson logic are: McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc-, supra notes
137-45 and accompanying text, McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, supra notes 146-63, 165, 167-72

and accompanying text, and although it does not cite Henson, Sullivan, supratext accompanying
notes 270-73, uses similar reasoning.
281. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1505 (finding that "observation in Henson is equally applicable to
the situation where a homosexual male propositions another male").
282. See cases cited supranotes 119-33, 135-36 and accompanying text.
283. See supratext accompanying notes 132-36.
284. See supratext accompanying notes 135-36.

285. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1504.
286. Oncale, 118S. Ct. at 1003.
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V. JUDICIAL DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Cases that allow a cause of action for homosexual same-sex sexual
harassment, but not heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment, discriminate based on sexual orientation. If the plaintiff can fulfill all of
the elements of either quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual
harassment, then he or she should have a cause of action. The sexual
orientation of the parties should be a contributing circumstance, not
a determinative factor.
The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Romer v. Evans.28 7 Romer was a constitutional challenge to a recent Colorado Constitutional Amendment that "prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.,,2" The Constitutional Amend-

ment, Justice Kennedy writes, "is at once too narrow and too broad.
It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. 2

9

The Court declared the Colorado

Constitutional Amendment unconstitutional.2 0
The language of Title VII is clear: "[It is] an unlawful employment
practice for an employer.., to discriminate.., because of an individual's.., sex .... "2 The statute does not mention sexual orientation, and the courts therefore should not consider sexual orientation.
Furthermore, based on the Supreme Court's Romer opinion, judges
should not disqualify a class of persons from the right to seek specific
protection from the law due to their sexual orientation.
Martin is a perfect example of the judicial protection of machismo
behavior, that adversely affects the rights of homosexual persons. 2
By allowing heterosexuals to harass an individual who is either homosexual or perceived to be a homosexual, the court discriminates
against persons based on their sexual orientation.2 3 Martin was told
he looked like he had AIDS and Was often grabbed.24 Nonetheless,
the court determined there was no sexual harassment because nei287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id.
Id. at 633.
See id at 635 (stating that, "[a] state cannot so deem a class a stranger to its laws").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1997).
Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1050.
Henson, 682 F.2d at 897.
Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1047.

Summer 19981

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

ther Martin nor his male harassers were homosexual2 5 If the harassment was based on Martin's sex, Martin should have had a cause of
action under Henson regardless of the parties sexual orientation.
Utilizing the plain language of Title VII and the Court's opinion in
Romer, sexual orientation should not be a determinative factor when
evaluating a same-sex sexual harassment claim.
The Fourth Circuit considered sexual orientation in Wrightson v.
8
Pizza HutY27 McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,2 Mayo v.
Kiwest Corp.,m and Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co."' Most recently, Wightson addressed same-sex sexual harassment when a homosexual supervisor at Pizza Hut harassed a heterosexual employee."' For the first time, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
found a cause of action for homosexual same-sex sexual harassment... 2
McWilliams and Mayo have similar fact patterns.30 3 As an automotive
mechanic with the County Transportation Agency, McWilliams' coconduct.0 4
workers bombarded him with a variety of offensive sexual
These co-workers were known as the "lube boys., 305 The "lube boys"
taunted McWilliams with sexual remarks such as "[t]he only woman
you could get is one who is deaf, dumb and blind," offered him
money for sex, fondled and blindfolded him, tied him up and then
forced him to his knees where one would put his finger in McWilliams mouth to simulate oral sex.306
Jerry Mayo worked for Kiwest, a construction and real estate management company.0 7 Richard Flanagan, Mayo's supervisor, made
sexually explicit and vulgar comments to Mayo including "you smell

295. See id. (stating, "[t]here is... no evidence that Martin or any of the individual defendants are homosexual").
296. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
297. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
298. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
299. No. 95-2638, 1996 WL 460769, at *1, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20445, 71 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 736, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 44,383 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 1996).
300. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
301. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 139.
302. See id at 143 (holding that "a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment
claim may lie under Title VII....").
303. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1191; Mayo, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20445, at *3.
304. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193.
305. Id
306. Id.
307. Mayo, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20445, at *2.
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good enough to fluck," "blow me," "suck me," and "lick my sack."0s
Flanagan told other employees Mayo was homosexual'0 9 Flanagan
published a photo, which he had falsely created by superimposing
Mayo's head on another man's body, that depicted Mayo wearing
only black underwear.30 Despite the flagrant acts, the McWilliams
court held no claims for sexual harassment exist when both the alleged harasser and victim are heterosexual and of the same-sex.31'
The Mayo court applied McWilliams and dismissed the cause of action because Mayo did not allege Flanagan was a homosexual. 3 2 Both
cases are examples of judicial protection of machismo behavior and
judicial action prohibiting a class of persons from seeking a legal
remedy based on their actual or perceived sexual orientation. 3 3 The

bottom line is the homosexual (or perceived homosexual) plaintiff
does not have the right to pursue a claim if the defendant is not homosexual. 4
The court in Hopkins discussed the rationale for finding a same-sex
sexual harassment claim by looking at previous cases, and by following McWilliams, which held that there is no cause of action for samesex sexual harassment.3 s The evidentiary burden to establish harassment based on sex is a showing that the harasser acted for sexual
gratification. 36 The court rejected the notion that sexually oriented
activity towards another man automatically imposes liability under Title VII, and conceded that although there "'ought to be a law
against'... puerile and repulsive workplace behavior... Title VII is
not that law." 17 Relying on the four cases addressed by the court of
appeals, the Fourth Circuit also incorrectly makes sexual orientation
a determinative factor. 318
The Eighth Circuit brought same-sex sexual harassment law to a
new level by ignoring the parties' sexual orientation in Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc.319 Quick is a rare example of a heterosexual person
308. Id at *2-3.
309. Id.
310. Id.at*3-4.
311. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195.
312. Mayo, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20445, at *11-12.
313. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195; Mayo, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20445, at *4.
314. Id.
315. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749-52 (4th Cir. 1996).
316. Id. at 752.
317. See i. (quoting McWlliams, 72 F.3d at 1196).
318. Id.
319. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
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harassing a heterosexual person of the same sexy ° Phil Quick was3 1a
plant.
welder and press operator at an Iowa muffler production
The employees and supervisors at the plant would "bag" each other
for sport.s 2 At trial, a witness described "bagging" as anything from
"intentional grabbing and squeezing of another person's testicles" to
"walk[ing] past another and making a feinting motion with his hand
toward the other's groin."' s23 Quick claimed that co-workers "bagged"
him over 100 times with most of the incidents occurring in 1991."24 In
August 1991, a co-worker held Quick down while another worker
squeezed Quick's left testicle, which produced swelling and bruising.s Other co-workers falsely labeled Quick a homosexual, stuck
tags on his forklift stating "Gay and Proud," and wrote "queer" on his
work identification card.2 6 Quick complained repeatedly about the
"bagging," assault, and harassment, but his superiors ignored the
complaints. 2 7 In 1992, the plant manager finally circulated a memo
defining "bagging" as sexual harassment 2 The plant managers also
reviewed the sexual harassment policy with their supervisors, and instructed the supervisors to review the policy with their subordinates. 32
Soon after, the "bagging" ended.30
The Eighth Circuit first analyzed these facts under the requirements delineated for a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim.sl The court determined Quick's workplace created the requisite hostile environment circumscribed by Title VII. 3 2 Next, the court
addressed the district court's rejection of a cause of action for samesex sexual harassment.3 3 The Eighth Circuit attacked the district
court's argument that "the challenged conduct was not of a genuine
sexual nature and therefore not sexual harassment... [and] neither
bagging nor the physical attacks expressed sexual interest nor in320. Id.
321. See i& at 1374 (explaining plaintiff's occupation and employer).
322. See id (describing defendant's workplace environment).
323. Id. at 1374.
324. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1375.
325. Id.
326. See id (describing Quick's treatment at his workplace).
327. See id (explaining Quicek's response to the harassment he endured at work).
328. Id. at 1375.
329. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1372.
330. See id. (explaining actions taken by the employer in response to Quick's complaints).
331. See id at 1377-78 (applying to plaintiff's case the Title VII factors to establish sex discrimination based on a hostile work environment).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1378-79.
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volved sexual favors or comments."' 4 Instead, the court held:
[a] worker 'need not be propositioned, touched offensively, or
harassed by sexual innuendo' in order to have been sexually harassed .... Intimidation and hostility may occur without explicit
sexual advances or acts of an explicitly sexual nature. Moreover,
physical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse may amount to sexual
M5
harassment.3
The Eighth Circuit stated that, "[t] he district court also incorrectly
concluded that the alleged harassment was not based on gender because it'' found
the underlying motive was personal enmity or hoolis
ganism.
gaiM,,336
The Eighth Circuit reached a sound result in Quick.3 7 Sexual harassment is not always about wanting to have sex with the victim.338
Quick clearly established that sex, not sexual gratification, is the basis
for sexual harassment." 9 The legislature did not make sexual gratification a prerequisite for a sexual harassment claim.34 ° According to
statute, discrimination merely needs to be based on sex.yI The Quick
reasoning parallels the statute's plain language but could easily have
been determined to be joking or roughhousing."2
Many district courts in the Eleventh Circuit consider the sexual
orientation of the parties.3 ' Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Corp.
does not recognize a cause of action for heterosexual same-sex sexual
harassment." The Northern District of Alabama used the same reasoning as the Quick court, that is, heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment does not create a cause of action due to the absence of a desire for sexual gratification. 6
334. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378-79.
335. See id.
at 1379 (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d, 964-65 (8th Cir.
1993) (citing Burns,989 F.2d at 965 and Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir.

1988))).
336. Id
337. Id. at 1380.
338. Id. at 1379.
339. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379.
340. See id. at 1377 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1998)).
341. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998).
342. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc,,
118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).
343. Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins.; cases cited supra notes 66-76; Martin v.
Norfolk S. Ry. Corp., supranotes 124-36; McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., supra notes 151-63, 16881; Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., supra notes 182-206, 209-30; Sullivan v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., supranotes 270-73.
344, See supratext accompanying notes 124-36.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 124-36.
346. Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1049.

Summer 1998]

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

The most outrageous case in the Eleventh Circuit is the district
court's opinion in Fredette.37 The district court's reasoning is flawed
because if same-sex sexual harassment is discrimination based on
sexual orientation, so is opposite-sex sexual harassment.348 A heterosexual woman who harasses her heterosexual male secretary is harassing him based on his heterosexual orientation 4 Fredette'sreasoning
would destroy the male secretary's cause of action as well."'0 Harassing a person because they are gay or lesbian and harassing them because they are a man or a woman are two different things. 5 ' The
woman in the hypothetical harasses her secretary based on his sex,
not on his sexual orientation, just as Mr. Sunshine harassed Fredette
based on his sex, not his sexual orientation. 5 2
While no Eleventh Circuit case finds a cause of action in neutral
terms, similar to Quick, courts address the issue in dicta. In Fredette,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion recognized Quick in a
footnote, noting the opinion could be construed as holding that
there is a viable claim under Title VII for heterosexual same-sex harassment. 353 Unfortunately, the court did not take a stand on the issue.354 McElroy v. TNS Mills, Inc. addressed the sexual orientation
question and declined to follow Mayo dicta. 5 Instead, McElroy held
that sexual orientation is immaterial. 3 6
VI. THE LOWER COuRTs' CHALLENGE IN INTERPRETING THE ONCALE
OPINION

The Court's broad language in Oncale is sure to spin litigators in a
furious attempt to equate the facts of their case with the "teasing" and

"roughhousing" example, or to distinguish it.35 7 Unfortunately, Jus-

tice Scalia used an example of the obvious, not the close call. 3"8 The
close call is left to the district court and the circuit court of appeals

347. See supratext accompanying notes 182-206, 209-30.
348. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510.
349. Id. at 1509.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1504.
352. Id.
353. SeeFredett, 112 F.3d at 1507 n.6 (recognizing the Quickprecedent).
354. See d. (noting that the court does not need to deal with the "more difficult question" of
same-sex sexual harassment).
355. See supranotes 77-90, 92-100.
356. See supranotes 77-90, 92-100.
357. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
358. Id.
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judges to decide.m9
Unfortunately, courts have already used the "teasing" and "roughhousing" standard to stand for the proposition that there is no cause
of action for same-sex sexual harassment.3 6' The lower courts are going to need to look past society's preference for machismo behavior
and determine if the discrimination is "based on sex." By including
the "teasing" and "roughhousing" examples, the Supreme Court gives
the district court and circuit court of appeals judges a way to find that
there is no cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment even when
the sexual harassment is "based on sex."
In a time when courts are more often the fact finders when ruling
on summary judgment motions, the persons who are going to suffer
the most harm from this opinion are the persons who need the most
protection, specifically, homosexuals 6 Conservative judges throughout the United States are going to use the Supreme Court's language
to continue to protect machismo behavior. 6 2 Just as in the Martin case,
those individuals perceived as homosexual persons are going to be
teased and taunted, and courts are going to find that the harassment
is not actionable unless the harassment is clearly based on sex." A
woman in similar circumstances does not suffer the same harassment.3 6
Only time will tell where the court will go on the same-sex sexual
harassment issue. Based on the history of same-sex sexual harassment
law, the Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale and the way "sex has a
way of befogging the higher intellectual faculties,"' ' the same-sex
sexual harassment road is sure to have potholes and sharp turns that
not even the Supreme Court anticipates.

359. Id.
360. See supra text accompanying note 19.
361. Onca/ 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id.
Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1044.
Id.
Toobin, supranote 2, at 48.

